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Quasirealism as Semantic Dispensability1 
 
Please note, this is the penultimate draft of a paper forthcoming in 
Philosophical Studies. Please cite and quote the published version. 
 
Abstract. I argue that standard explanationist solutions to the problem of 
creeping minimalism are largely on the right track, but they fail to correctly 
specify the kind of explanation that is relevant to distinguishing realism 
from quasirealism. Quasirealism should not be distinguished from realism 
in terms of the explanations it gives of why a normative judgment—a 
normative sentence or attitude—has the semantic content that it has. 
Rather, it should be distinguished in terms of the explanations it offers of 
what the semantic content of a normative judgment is. 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The predicate ‘true’ is the source of the problem, that and the verb ‘believe’. Initially, 
expressivism seemed like an irrealist doctrine. Despite having the surface grammar of 
an ordinary descriptive sentence, ‘murder is wrong’ did not describe. It expressed a 
 
1 Research in this paper was partially supported by research leave from Lingnan University, and 
was substantially supported by a General Research Fund grant from the Research Grants Council 
of Hong Kong SAR, China (LU1360128). Thanks to Tristram McPherson, Dan Waxman, and the 
two anonymous referees, all of whom provided exceptional criticism, objections, and positive 
suggestions, without which this would be a much weaker paper. 
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noncognitive attitude of, say, disapproval towards murder. Neither normative claims 
nor attitudes were supposed to be truth-apt (e.g., Ayer 1936/1952). 
Unfortunately, expressivism is a claim about our normative language, the one we 
grow up speaking. But it is perfectly good English to say, ‘It’s true that murder is 
wrong’. Similarly, we talk about people’s moral beliefs. As a theory of our normative 
language, irrealist expressivism makes poor predictions. 
So expressivists add sophistication to their story. There is a minimalist theory of 
truth, and by helping themselves to it, they can better accommodate the linguistic data. 
We can extend this minimalism to beliefs, as well. But as expressivism becomes more 
sophisticated, it risks losing its distinctiveness. This same minimalism looks like it can 
be extended to every component of the characteristically realist ideology. But then 
expressivism seems to collapse into realism. Jamie Dreier has named this the problem of 
creeping minimalism (2004). 
Dreier also offers a solution: the explanation explanation (ibid). The expressivist 
may agree that there are normative properties, in an appropriately minimal sense of 
property. But, ‘to explain what it is to make a moral judgment, we need not mention any 
normative properties’ (39). The realist’s explanation, on the other hand, must invoke such 
properties. 
I will argue that Dreier’s explanation explanation gets something right. Normative 
properties are different for the quasirealist in that they are in an important sense 
dispensable. But Dreier assumes the relevant kind of dispensability is metasemantic—that 
normative properties are dispensable to explanations of “what it is to make a … judgment” 
with a certain semantic content (or at least the explanation has been understood in the 
subsequent literature as a metasemantic one). This general strategy of carving out the 
difference between quasirealism and realism in terms of metasemantic explanations has, 
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moreover, become the standard one (e.g., Chrisman 2008; Dunaway 2016; Simpson 
2018).2 
This overlooks one of the most striking features of traditional expressivism. It is, or 
traditionally has been at least, a novel semantic thesis, explaining what normative utterances 
mean in terms of the attitudes they express.3 On this basis, I will argue that the quasirealist 
is not offering a special type of metasemantic explanation. Rather, the quasirealist is 
committed to a distinctive kind of semantic explanation. 
Admittedly, the exact borders between semantics and metasemantics are themselves 
disputed. As I will use these phrases, a metasemantic explanation explains why something 
means what it does, while a semantic explanation simply tells us what it means. It is 
dispensability to this latter kind of explanation, I will argue, that is most relevant to the 
expressivist metaethical project. The proposal will also allow us to develop both robustly 
realist and quasirealist versions of inferentialist and conceptual role semantics, the value 
of which will emerge in the discussion. Finally, I will discuss the extent to which this 
solution is available to the recent program of reinterpreting expressivism (or some version 
of quasirealism) as a metasemantic thesis (e.g. Ridge 2014; Chrisman 2016; and Köhler 
2017 and 2018). Any apparent incompatibility is probably mostly verbal. 
I will start with a brief explanation of why minimalism creeps. 
 
2. Why Minimalism Creeps 
 
 
2 For a summary discussion of various solutions and objections, see (Dreier 2018). 
3 This is true even of Gibbard (1990; and 2003), who identifies the semantic content with abstract 
entities, such as world-norm pairs. See footnote 15. 
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Expressivism risks being an overly revisionary theory of normative language.4 So we 
adopt deflationism about truth. According to the deflationist, the predicate ‘true’ does 
not denote a substantive property. To attribute truth to a sentence or proposition is not 
to attribute correspondence, coherence, or possession of a primitive property of being 
true. Rather, what truth is, is exhausted by the instances of the T-schema: 
 
  p is true if and only if p.5 
 
Notice that even if ‘true’ does not denote a substantive property, the predicate is still 
very useful. Given the T-schema, attribution of truth can serve as a device for 
disquotation, reassertion, and quantification. I can say, for example, “Everything Kant 
said is true,” and thereby reassert everything Kant said. I can do this, even if I am not 
totally sure of everything Kant said. 
With truth sufficiently domesticated, the expressivist is ready to tame belief. 
What is it to believe that p? The minimalist answer is: to regard p as true (e.g., Chrisman 
2008: 344).6 But calling p true is simply another way of saying that p. So, to have a 
belief, then, is simply to be in a state that could be expressed in a declarative sentence 
(Lenman 2003: 38; Dreier 2004: 27-28). 
The expressivist is thereby able to account for realistic aspects of our language. 
But quasirealism comes with a challenge. We’ve agreed that some normative claims are 
 
4 But see (McPherson forthcoming) for a defense of revisionary expressivism; also see (Richard 2008: 
72-88). 
5 For classic statements of deflationism or minimalism, see Hartry Field (1994) and Paul Horwich 
(1998a and -b). 
6 Alternately, a belief is any state of mind that can be expressed by a sentence with an assertoric 
syntactic form (Timmons 1999; and Dreier 2004). 
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true and others false, and that these claims express beliefs. How is that not just realism? 
In what sense is the realism merely quasi? 
Perhaps it is in the denial of more arcane theoretical commitments that the 
quasirealist will stake out her position. There might be normative beliefs and truth-apt 
normative sentences, but we can at least deny that there are normative properties and 
propositions. The problem is, our minimalist account of truth seems to lead to minimalist 
accounts of philosophical arcana as well. There is a plausible deflationary schema for 
‘property’: 
 
x has property F if and only if x is F. 
 
 The term ‘property’ would seem to make a useful contribution to communication very 
similar to that proposed for ‘true’. We can say things such as, ‘These two objects share 
many important properties’, without predicating each of the similarities individually. 
The generalization would otherwise be impossible, since English grammar does not 
allow for second-order quantification.7 
Propositions can be accounted for with a deflationary schema as well: 
 
‘S’ expresses the proposition that S. 
 
 
7 See (Svavarsdóttir 2019 and McPherson 2019). 
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Talk of propositions and the use of that-clauses is another convenient way of making 
generalizations, of expressing that one statement can be translated into another, and 
relating our mental states to what is linguistically communicated.8 
So there is a natural way of giving deflationary accounts of the arcana. Still, one 
may wonder whether the deflationist about truth must accept them, whether she can’t 
keep her deflationism specific to truth alone. The difficulty is, properties and 
propositions are, on standard understandings, already connected with the realistic 
terminology the expressivist has taken on board. What are propositions? They are the 
fundamental bearers of truth-values, the things that get disquoted, that figure as the 
contents of beliefs (Schroeder 2008: 160). So it looks like we have normative 
propositions. These normative propositions predicate properties of objects (e.g., 
murder is wrong), and so if they are true, the relevant property (being wrong) must be 
instantiated. And so on.9  
This is the problem of creeping minimalism. It leaves the expressivist with two 
connected problems. First, she must find a way of differentiating her account from 
other metaethical theories. Second, she must preserve the idea that there is some 
asymmetry between the normative and the nonnormative, that properties like being green 
or being a star are somehow more real that properties like being wrong. Otherwise the 
fundamental motivation for the view slips away. 
 
3. Dreier’s Explanation Explanation 
 
8 For excellent discussions of what sort of communicative role propositions-talk and that-clauses 
could play on a deflationary theory, see (Köhler 2017 and 2018). 
9 The presentation of these interconnections is here left intuitive. For rigorous presentation of the 
same, see David Taylor’s (2020). 
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Enter Dreier’s explanation explanation. Even after we embrace minimalist notions of 
truth, belief, propositions, and properties, there is still, he holds, a distinctively 
expressivist thesis. 
 
…[E]xpressivists are distinguished by their claim that there is nothing to 
making a normative judgment over and above being in a state that plays a 
certain ‘non-cognitive’ psychological role, a role more like desire than it is like 
factual belief. In particular, to explain what it is to make a moral judgment, 
we need not mention any normative properties. 
(2004: 39) 
 
The expressivist can agree that there are normative properties and propositions. But 
these properties and propositions are dispensable. We can explain what it is to make a 
normative judgment without invoking them. One believes murder is wrong in virtue 
of, for example, disapproving of murder.10 That explanation makes no reference to 
being wrong. This provides a satisfying sense in which the realism is merely quasi. 
Normative properties do not even play the extremely minimal role of explaining what 
it is to believe a normative theory. That’s how dispensable they are. 
One interpretive complication is that Dreier does not specify the kind of 
explanation he has in mind (Asay 2013; and Taylor 2020). Nonetheless, it is most 
natural to understand his solution as a claim about the kind of metasemantic 
 
10 ‘Disapproving’ here is a placeholder for some more detailed account of the noncognitive attitude 
expressivists identify with normative judgment, such as accepting norms that endorse getting angry 
(Gibbard 1990) or being for blaming (Schroeder 2008). 
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explanation a quasirealist will make—where a metasemantic explanation is a 
metaphysical explanation of the nature (or of the grounds) of content and other 
intentional properties. Dreier’s locutions here, that the quasirealist offers ‘to explain what 
it is to make a moral judgment” [emphasis added], or that the normative judgment is 
“nothing over and above” some noncognitive state, are both characteristic ways of 
indicating that the explanation in question is a metaphysical one. What’s more, in 
subsequent discussion Dreier worries that the explanation explanation mistakenly classifies 
Ralph Wedgwood as a quasirealist; and Wedgwood’s explanation of normative judgments 
is explicitly metasemantic. 
 
4. Objections to the Explanation Explanation11 
 
Unfortunately, theories that seem straightforwardly nonexpressivist meet Dreier’s 
criterion. 
First, an error theorist must think that the property of being wrong does not play 
any role in explaining what it is to believe that murder is wrong, since there is no such 
property and explanation is factive (Chrisman 2008; Dreier 2018: 534; and Simpson 
2018: 516). But this means that if we use Dreier’s explanation explanation to 
distinguish the quasirealist from the realist, an error theorist will count as a quasirealist. 
 
11 Due to its complexity, I am unable to discuss in detail David Taylor’s (2020) challenge to the 
explanation explanation. Taylor’s argument, if successful, shows that the explanation explanation 
is incompatible with deflationism. I will simply note that Taylor’s objection is to solving the 
problem of creeping minimalism with some substantive account of the nature of reference and 
predicate-satisfaction. Given that I draw the distinction between realism and quasirealism in terms 
of explanations of what something’s content is, rather than in terms of the metaphysical 
explanation of that content, Taylor’s objection will not apply to my solution. 
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Second, the explanation explanation seems to misclassify Ralph Wedgwood as a 
quasirealist (Eklund 2017: 156ff; and Dreier 2018: 544-545). Wedgwood accepts a 
conceptual role semantics, according to which our concepts are individuated by their 
inferential or conceptual role (2001 and 2007). For example, concept C is identical with 
the concept AND in virtue of regulating beliefs in accordance with the introduction and 
elimination rules for conjunction. Believing p and believing q commits one to believing 
C(p, q); and believing C(p, q) commits one to believing p and to believing q (2001: 6ff.; 
2007: 83ff.). Wedgwood extends this account of concept individuation to normative 
concepts. Concept B is identical to the concept of BETTER THAN in virtue of B’s having 
the role of regulating an agent’s preferences. Believing BETTER THAN (p, q) commits 
the agent to preferring p to q (2001). The concept OUGHT similarly regulates intention, 
though in a more complex way (2007). 
As Wedgwood describes the strategy: ‘we must avoid … using these [analysed] 
terms inside the scope of propositional attitude ascriptions’ in order to explain ‘what 
it is for a thought to be a thought involving the concept in question’ (2007: 83). So 
Wedgwood is explicitly committed to explaining what it is to believe that dogs are 
better than cats, for example, without appealing to a property of being better than. What 
is it to believe that? It is to be in the state that commits you to preferring dogs to cats. 
Dreier acknowledges that his explanation explanation seems to identify 
Wedgwood as a quasirealist. Regarding Wedgwood’s normative semantics and Alan 
Gibbard’s expressivist semantics, he writes, “I am worried that I classify them together 
when they should be separated” (2018: 544-45). 
 
5. Interlude on Quasirealist Inferentialism 
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The question of whether Wedgwood can be classified as a realist is made more pressing 
when we consider Matthew Chrisman’s inferentialism about normative expressions 
(2008, 2010, and 2016). In his (2008 and 2010), Chrisman proposes a rival solution to 
creeping minimalism. Rather than identifying the difference between the normative 
and the more genuinely real in terms of the role normative properties do or don’t play 
in explaining content, Chrisman advocates a turn to inferentialist metasemantics.12 
Inferentialism is similar to conceptual role semantics,13 but rather than accounting for 
meaning primarily in terms of the functional properties of an individual’s mental states, 
it explains meaning in terms of the public social commitments that linguistic utterances 
create to reason (and act) in certain ways. As Chrisman puts it: 
 
…[T]he inferentialist approach encourages us to explain the content of mental 
states in terms of the content of statements that conventionally express these 
mental states, which in turn is explained in terms of their role in the socially-
embodied inferential practice of making statements and giving and asking for 
reasons for these statements. 
(2008: 349-50) 
 
Descriptive claims should be thought of as conclusions of theoretical reason, 
normative claims conclusions of practical reason. This means that the reasons one 
offers to support a descriptive claim will be evidential reasons, whereas those 
supporting a normative claim will be practical reasons. Practical conclusions rationally 
license actions in ways descriptive conclusions do not (2008: 350-51). When we 
 
12 For a classic statement of the theory, see (Brandom 1994). 
13 Also see (Dreier 2018: 544). 
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consider these differences in the inferential roles between theoretical and practical 
claims, we have a sense in which the former but not the latter describe reality (352). 
It is unclear, however, that Chrisman’s inferentialism is sufficient to rule out 
robust realism on its own.14 To see why, notice how similar it is Wedgewood’s 
conceptual role semantics. We could, presumably, “translate” Wedgwood’s position 
into an inferentialist one. Rather than talk about concepts, we will say the public term 
‘F’ means better than just in case asserting ‘F (x, y)’ conversationally commits the speaker 
to choosing x over y. But if Wedgwood’s conceptual version of the doctrine was 
compatible with realism, it is unclear what happened in our translation to rule realism 
out. Or, if Chrisman’s inferentialism leads to quasirealism, how does conceptual role 
semantics avoid it? Both views say that a judgment is normative not in virtue of how 
it is guided by “upstream” inputs, but how it leads to motivation or licenses choice.  
This suggests an additional criterion for quasirealism—ideally our theory would 
explain how a conceptual role theorist or an inferentialist could be either a realist or a 
quasirealist, depending on further commitments. 
 
6.  What the Expressivist Is Thinking 
 
My proposal is that Dreier’s explanation explanation is to a large extent correct, but 
that it fails to specify the kind of explanation the quasirealist is offering. The 
quasirealist can give a special kind of semantic explanation, whereas the explanation 
explanation runs into problems because it looks to metasemantic explanations.  
 
14 For the more standard objection to Chrisman’s solution, see (Tiefensee 2016: 2443-44; and 
Dreier 2018: 536-37). 
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This will require that we specify more clearly the distinction between semantics 
and metasemantics, along with characterizing the relationship between formal (or 
compositional) semantics and semantics more generally. As I will use the phrase, the 
paradigm case of a semantic explanation explains what a word or expression means (e.g., 
Achinstein 1983: 33 and fn. 21). This is a familiar kind of explanation. It is the kind of 
explanation I give when my son asks me “What is a reptile?” or “What is an election?” 
and I try my best to offer him a definition serviceable to a young child. To explain 
what a word or sentence means is usually just to offer a definition, or a translation, or 
provide examples of how the expression is used. A metasemantic explanation, in 
contrast, explains why these sentences have those meanings; it is an explanation in 
terms of the metaphysical nature or grounds of semantic properties. 
On this taxonomy, formal or compositional semantics is only a portion of 
semantics, because it does not completely explain what the expressions in a natural 
language mean, nor does it aim to. Consider, for example, explaining the meaning of 
‘necessarily’ with ‘Necessarily p is true at w iff p is true in all worlds accessible from w’. 
We have not fully explained the meaning of ‘necessarily’ until we say, for example, 
what worlds are. If talk of possible worlds is not intended literally—if they are not real 
objects in our ontology—but simply as a device for modeling aspects of meaning, the 
explanation is incomplete until we are told what is being modeled. 
This is not to deny that there is much that formal semantics does explain about 
meaning. For example, among the semantic properties of a linguistic expression are its 
logical properties and its compositional properties, and these are properties which a 
formal metalanguage is uniquely suited to illuminate. In answer to our question what 
‘necessarily’ means, it tells us that whatever it means must stand in certain logical relations 
to whatever certain other expressions mean, and whatever it means must be a function of 
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a certain sort that takes certain other types of meanings—whatever they are—as 
arguments.  
To avoid confusion, it is important to emphasize that mine is not the only 
available taxonomy.15 Chrisman, for example, classifies those questions about what an 
expression means beyond its compositional properties as metasemantic (2016: 15, fn. 
17, and 17). Still, at this point in the paper, any disagreement is merely verbal. Chrisman 
agrees that compositional semantics does not provide a complete account of what 
natural language expressions mean (2016: 10-18). He is also clear that the use of truth-
conditional semantics should not be thought to commit us to a realistic or 
representationalist picture of meaning (10-12); rather, truth-conditional semantics are 
a “convenient” device “to keep track of the commonality of content across… 
embeddings…” (11). 
What is the motivation for my taxonomy? First, the claims of formal semantics 
are partial answers to what-questions, and so they make up a natural class with other 
theses that answer (partially or completely) the same what-questions, and this class 
contrasts naturally with theses that answer other questions, such as the why-question. 
Second, to identify semantics with formal or compositional semantics obscures the 
fact that nonlinguistic entities can have semantic properties as well. Maps, diagrams, 
and mental states can all have content; they can be true or false, satisfied or unsatisfied, 
veridical or nonveridical. 
Finally, my own solution to the problem of creeping minimalism is distinguished 
from traditional explanationist answers in that it focuses on answers to what- rather 
than why-questions. This taxonomy gives a convenient handle for identifying the kind 
of solution I propose. 
 
15 Also see Köhler (2018: 338-39). 
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As noted, the issue at this point is verbal. Those opposed to my taxonomy are 
welcome to think of the distinction I have invoked in terms of explanations of what 
something’s content is, versus explanations of why it has that content. 
Two final points should be made about semantic explanations. First, I said that 
the paradigm case of a semantic explanation is an explanation of what an expression 
means. But given my definition, it is natural to identify any explanation of what 
something’s content is as semantic. Thus, I will treat explaining what someone is 
thinking about, or explaining what a map or diagram tells us, as semantic explanations 
as well. The key idea here is that semantic explanations tell us what something’s content 
is, along with the intentional relations (e.g., illocutionary force, direction of fit, 
attitudinal relations) it bears to that content. Those who dislike this taxonomy could 
instead call these intentional explanations, to be contrasted with meta-intentional explanations 
of the why something has its content and other intentional properties. It is enough for 
my purposes if we are aware of what they have in common with paradigmatically 
semantic explanations. 
Second, explanations of what an expression means are often indirect: we do not 
provide a translation or definition, but rather state or provide examples of how the 
expression is used. Importantly for the expressivist, an indirect semantic explanation 
of this sort may still be a complete one (though often it will be incomplete). The T-
schema is an indirect explanation of the meaning of ‘true’, but one that, according to 
deflationists, exhaustively accounts for the predicate’s meaning. Expressivists should be 
understood as similarly giving an indirect explanation of what terms mean—explaining 
how ‘wrong’ is used to express various noncognitive attitudes is a way of exhaustively 
explaining what the predicate means (Dreier 2015: 282ff.). 
While these indirect explanations do not identify for us what the content of an 
expression is, they are still of a class with direct explanations because they explain the 
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meaning of an expression by showing how the expression modifies the way other 
expressions are related to their content. According to the deflationist, we can’t directly 
say anything informative about the content of ‘true’—because it doesn’t designate a 
substantive property. But we can say how ‘true’ contributes to the content of larger 
expressions. The content of the sentence ‘p is true’ is p, and ‘true’ makes the sentence 
into a way of indirectly asserting that content. The content of ‘Everything Kant said is 
true’ is the propositional content of each of Kant’s utterances, and again ‘true’ makes 
the sentence into an indirect assertion of these contents. In short, an indirect 
explanation of the meaning of ‘true’ still explains, at least partly, what the word 
contributes to the meaning of the sentence in which it occurs. For deflationists, it fully 
explains the word’s contribution. 
With all this in place we can say that a striking feature of traditional expressivism 
is its unorthodox semantics: what a normative sentence means is explained in terms of 
the state of mind expressed. The meaning of ‘murder is wrong’ is an expression of 
disapproval of murder, or of planning on getting angry at murder, or of being for 
blaming for murder, etc.16  
 
16 This claim may seem limited to very traditional expressivism, as even Alan Gibbard (1990) 
identifies the meaning of normative sentences with sets of world-norm pairs, rather than expressed 
attitudes. But just as compositional semantics in terms of accessible worlds is an incomplete 
account of meaning until we know what worlds are or what they model, Gibbard’s semantics is 
incomplete until we know what norms (and worlds) are or model. What’s more, if Chrisman is 
right that truth-conditional semantics does not rule out irrealist or quasirealist metaethical views, it 
is hard to see why a formal semantics invoking norms distinct from worlds would be enough to 
rule out a robustly realist metaethics. In any case one plausible interpretation is that for Gibbard 
norms model an agent’s planning states, which are psychological states. Another is that Gibbard 
does not tell us directly what norms are, but provides an indirect explanation, in terms of what it 
 16 
Quasirealism risks obscuring this unique expressivist semantic commitment. It 
does so because it also commits the expressivist to saying ‘Murder is wrong’ means 
that murder is wrong. The first meaning—in terms of disappointment—is supposed 
to, in some sense, be more fundamental. And so it is natural to understand the 
quasirealist expressivist as offering a distinctive metasemantic thesis: ‘Murder is wrong’ 
means that murder is wrong in virtue of expressing disapproval of murder. 
This isn’t wrong. But we should be aware that insofar as she retains her unique 
semantic commitments, the kind of metasemantic explanation she is offering is 
unusual. The disapproval of murder is itself a meaning of the sentence. The expressivist 
is committed to saying that ‘Murder is wrong’ means one thing (that murder is wrong) 
in virtue of meaning another (disapproval of murder). 
Metasemantic explanations are not always like this. If someone says the word 
‘dog’ refers to dogs because of causal chains connecting us to an original baptism, they 
are not thereby committed to saying that the word ‘dog’ is about baptisms or causal 
chains.17 
Quasirealism is unique, then, in saying that normative utterances have two 
complete meanings, one of which is given in terms of normative properties, and one 
 
is to accept a norm. Thus talk of world-norm pairs plus an account of what it is to accept a norm 
provides an indirect but complete explanation of what normative sentences mean, in terms of what 
it is to accept them (see Dreier 2015: 283-84). 
Thanks to a referee for asking me to be clearer on this point. 
17 Would such a metasemantic story of why ‘dog’ has its content still provide an indirect explanation 
of the word’s meaning? Not in the same sense that I have been using the phrase. An indirect 
explanation of meaning in my sense provides information on how an expression modifies the 
meaning of expressions of which it is part, without attributing a referent to the expression. This is 
different from providing information that lets someone infer the referent of ‘dog’. 
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of which is given in terms of expressed attitude. This points to a way in which 
normative properties are dispensable. We could, in principle, say what every possible 
normative sentence in our language means without mentioning normative properties. 
Dreier’s explanation explanation, then, is in some sense right. But it has been 
developed in terms of the wrong kind of explanation, an explanation of why words 
mean what they do, or why thoughts have the content they do. The proposal works 
much better if we interpret it instead as a claim about semantic explanations. 
Quasirealism is distinctive for holding that there is an alternative way of explaining 
completely what the content of a normative thought or sentences is, without 
mentioning normative properties (Lenman 2003). 
Dreier, it should be noted, puts things not primarily in terms of explaining 
linguistic meaning, but of explaining what it is to make a judgment with normative 
content. As noted, this has been interpreted in the subsequent literature as a kind of 
metasemantic (or meta-intentional) explanation, a metaphysical explanation of the 
nature or grounds of content. We can avoid standard objections, however, if we instead 
characterize quasirealism in terms of a special kind of semantic (or intentional) 
explanation, a special explanation of what a normative thought is about. 
My proposal is this: the quasirealist thinks that we can fully explain what the 
person who believes that murder is wrong is thinking about without mentioning being 
wrong, as long as we can indicate the way in which she is thinking about it. What is 
she thinking about? Murder. How is she thinking about it? Disapprovingly. The 
quasirealist also thinks we can fully explain what ‘murder is wrong’ means, without 
mentioning wrongness, as long as we can say which attitude the sentence expresses. 
So, as a first pass, the quasirealist is committed to the following theses: 
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INTENTIONAL. We can completely explain what any normative belief 
is about by giving a characterization of the belief (i) which does not 
mention normative properties in describing the attitude’s content, by (ii) 
describing the belief as a desire-like intentional attitude. 
 
SEMANTIC. We can provide a complete explanation of what any 
normative assertion means in a metalanguage (i) which lacks any terms or 
expressions ascribing normative properties, by (ii) indicating which desire-
like intentional attitude the assertion expresses. 
 
I will identify both as semantic dispensability theses, as they identify certain contents 
as dispensable to explanations of what a sentence means or a thought is about. 
It is important to note what the theses do not say. They do not claim that we 
cannot also explain what normative beliefs are about or what normative utterances 
mean by invoking normative properties. The sophisticated expressivist will say that 
‘murder is wrong’ means murder is wrong and that it expresses the belief that murder is 
wrong (Timmons 1998). The distinctive commitment of the expressivist is that there 
is an alternative way of explaining what the sentence means or the thought is about, 
which does not invoke normative properties. This makes the more standard 
explanation dispensable, at least in principle. 
The theses do not misclassify error theory. The error theorist must think we can 
say why normative sentences mean what they mean without invoking normative 
properties, since there aren’t any. But she also thinks that we cannot say what the 
sentence means in terms that do not ascribe normative properties—otherwise there 
would be no error.  
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What does the thesis say about Wedgwood? It says that Wedgwood need not be a 
quasirealist. Wedgwood can explain why a belief is about cats being better than dogs, 
without invoking the better than relation, explaining instead in terms of the judgment’s 
functional role. But this does not mean that he can say what the belief is about without 
mentioning the better than relation. The belief is not about a functional role, any more 
than a conjunctive belief is about introduction and elimination rules. Admittedly, we 
may be able to use the functional role to offer an indirect explanation of what the belief 
is about. But this will only lead us to classify Wedgwood as a quasirealist if this indirect 
semantic explanation is complete (and Wedgwood has grounds for saying it is not). This 
will be addressed in sections 6.2 and 6.3. For now, the point is simply that conceptual 
role semantics, as a metasemantic (or meta-intentional) thesis, does not by itself entail 
quasirealism. 
Do the theses misclassify normative reductionism as a form of quasirealism? No, 
because they are given in terms of properties rather than vocabulary. Let’s say that being 
right reduces to maximizes happiness. Now either this means that being right is identical to 
maximizing happiness, or it does not (views about reduction and the fine-grainedness of 
properties differ). Let’s further say we try to explain that ‘Pushing the button is right’ 
means that pushing the button maximizes happiness. If the properties are identical, 
this explanation does not vindicate SEMANTIC, because we are explaining the 
meaning of the normative claim by using a complex predicate ‘maximizes happiness’ 
that ascribes a normative property. If the properties are not identical, the explanation 
of what the normative sentence means is at best incomplete. Mutatis mutandis for 
explanations of what normative beliefs are about. 
Both theses need refinement. We must expand them to allow for inferentialist 
quasirealists, or expressivists about, say, epistemic modals. Before all of that, though, 
I want to explain why this kind of dispensability—dispensability to explanations of 
 20 
content—is relevant to questions of quasirealism. After all, we have already seen that 
metasemantic dispensability is not. 
 
6.1. What Are We Arguing About? 
Dreier’s proposal was that our beliefs about the quasireal are different, because we can 
say what it is to have such a belief without invoking the property the belief is about. 
This seemed to get at something right, but it proved too broad for a variety of reasons. 
There are many ways of characterizing normative thoughts which don’t invoke the 
property the thought is about (Eklund, ibid.). If physicalism is correct, there may be 
some day when we can say, ‘He’s in brain state 284-C again’, and thereby say what he’s 
thinking without mention of normative properties. Less hypothetically, there are 
accounts such as Wedgwood’s. 
Metasemantic dispensability turned out to be irrelevant. But then why should 
semantic dispensability be the relevant sort?18 There are two reasons. First, 
expressivism is a metaethical theory, and therefore a project in metatheorizing. An 
essential part of metatheorizing must be determining what the first-order theories and 
debates of the relevant subject matter are about. But for that project, telling us what 
brain states the theorists are in is a non-starter. If philosophers ask what the subject 
matter of mathematics is, or what mathematicians are doing, they would not accept an 
answer in terms of how certain electrical signals lit up in the brains of these weird, 
ambulatory, fluid-filled bags, or an answer in terms that characterized the 
 
18 Or, to put the point another way, we can avoid objections to Dreier’s solution by insisting that 
certain kinds of explanations count, but others don’t. Now we need to show why that isn’t merely 
ad hoc stipulating away of objections. What is the motivation for treating some explanations as 
relevant and others not? 
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mathematicians as extremely complex input-output devices. A metatheoretical account 
is illuminating in virtue of helping us better understand what kind of reasoning the 
theories involve, and what aspects of the world the theorists are reasoning about.  
Semantic dispensability theses are special because they identify what it is to hold 
an opinion on some matter of first-order normative theory in terms of what such a 
statement or judgment is about (e.g., its content), and they do so in a vocabulary that 
is more immediately bound up with our conception of ourselves as agents and 
reasoners. That normative properties may be dispensable from other kinds of 
explanations of what it is to make a normative judgment is simply not relevant to the 
expressivist’s metatheoretical project. But dispensability for semantic explanations or 
explanations of what someone is thinking are relevant, because those characterizations 
are compatible with continuing to understand those making the judgments in question 
as theorists or reasoners. 
What does the expressivist think normative discourse is about? As noted above, 
the person who believes that murder is wrong is thinking about murder 
(disapprovingly). More generally, according to the quasirealist, normative discourse is 
about what to approve and disapprove of, or what to plan on doing,19 or what to favor 
(i.e., be for).20 On the most general level, it is about what to do and how to feel. 
According to the expressivist, we could, in principle, explain normative discourse to 
aliens unfamiliar with it, without ever making mention of normative properties—
whether as genuine pieces of reality, or even merely as something to which those who 
engage in normative discourse are committed. To explain normative discourse, it 
 
19 See (Gibbard 2003). 
20 See (Schroeder 2008). 
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would suffice to explain how those engaged in it were discussing what to do, think, 
and feel.21 
The motivation for the dispensability theses also helps us to determine whether 
a quasirealist must commit to both theses, or whether endorsing either one is sufficient 
for quasirealism.22 The default position is that a quasirealist must satisfy both. We want 
to explain what normative theorizing and reasoning are about. For that project, it 
seems we need to explain what our both normative thought and our normative talk are 
about. After all, normative theories are presented, and publicly debated about, with 
words. If we don’t satisfy both INTENTIONAL and SEMANTIC, there is some 
aspect of normative theorizing that we can only make sense of when understanding it 
as about normative properties. 
But what if one can give principled reasons why, for example, the way that 
theorizing is linguistically presented is relatively unimportant for understanding such 
theorizing? Wouldn’t we then have reasons for thinking that a quasirealist only needs 
to satisfy INTENTIONAL?23 Yes, but then such arguments need to be given; and 
even in this case, I suspect any quasirealist must satisfy at least a weaker version of 
SEMANTIC to be worthy of the name.  
Let me explain why. Suppose the aliens land, and they want to know what 
normative discourse and theories are about. So we explain what the participants are 
 
21 While our arguments are different, the resulting view is very similar to James Lenman’s (2003). 
22 Thanks to a referee for raising this question. 
23 This would bring my proposed solution closer to Dreier’s. But note that INTENTIONAL still 
rules out purely metasemantic (or meta-intentional) explanations—the explanation must still be in 
terms of what normative attitudes are about, rather than that in virtue of which they have their 
content. My solution would specify the kind of explanation we want, in a way that rules out the 
objections listed in section 4. Also see footnote 17. 
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thinking about, and we do so without mentioning normative properties. Of course, we 
do have to mention normative properties when explaining what they are saying or 
writing, but that’s just because there is no other way to account for some of the 
complex grammar of English (or Russian or Japanese). And the aliens weren’t asking 
about grammar. Their eyes glaze over. 
This may be enough to qualify as quasirealist. Talk normative properties is 
dispensable for understanding our normative reasoning, it seems. It’s just natural-
language grammar that requires us to mention them. 
There’s a question about the story, however. Have we told the aliens how the 
normative reasoners’ thoughts are logically related to one another? That is, can we 
explain what the first-order logical relations between normative beliefs are, while only 
characterizing those beliefs in noncognitive terms? 
If the answer is yes, we have a solution to the Frege-Geach problem, at least in 
its simpler iterations. We can explain normative negation and modus ponens, for example. 
We should also be able to give a partial explanation of what ‘Murder is wrong’ and ‘If 
murder is not wrong, then encouraging murder is wrong’ mean in terms of the attitudes 
they express. After all, they are used, in part, to express attitudes. (It’s hard to see how 
a theory could claim to be expressivist if it doesn’t allow this much.) But notice that 
this partial explanation is, from what we have said, by itself sufficient to explain the 
logical relations between the two object sentences. That ‘wrong’ predicates a property 
is not needed to explain logical relations between sentences containing the term: the 
role of ‘wrong’ in expressing condemnation is already enough for that. 
In short, we would have sufficient resources to satisfy: 
 
SEMANTIC-MINIMAL. We can provide a partial explanation of what 
any normative assertion means in a metalanguage (i) which lacks any terms 
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or expressions ascribing normative properties, by (ii) indicating which 
desire-like intentional attitude the assertion expresses, and (iii) which 
explains all first-order logical properties of sentences in the object-language. 
 
Let’s say, on the other hand, the answer is no. We can’t explain how normative beliefs 
are logically related to each other insofar as we characterize those beliefs 
noncognitively. Then we either have to say that relations of entailment, inconsistency, 
implication, and so on are marginal to understanding normative reasoning and 
theorizing—which is false—or we have to accept that how normative theories and 
reasoning are linguistically represented is an essential part of metatheoretical 
understanding. In that case, to qualify as quasirealists, we need to show that we can at 
least account for the first-order logical relations in normative language without talk of 
normative properties—it’s only wonkier compositional properties for which 
normative properties must be mentioned. But that means we still need to satisfy 
SEMANTIC-MINIMAL. 
 
6.2. More Generally 
Our two theses may provide a sense in which normative properties are dispensable, 
but at present they are too narrow. They assume a quasirealist is a metaethical 
expressivist. But expressivism has been proposed for other aspects of language, 
notably epistemic modals (Yalcin 2007; and Incurvati and Schlöder 2019). An 
expressivist of this sort will likely want to be a quasirealist about epistemic possibilities 
(e.g., epistemically possible worlds). What’s more, a conceptual role theorist or an 
inferentialist may wish to embrace quasirealism as well. 
Expressivism about a nonnormative domain is easy enough. We can simply 
broaden the state of mind that can be expressed and identified with the relevant kind 
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of belief. For example, to judge that might p is to be in a state in which one’s beliefs fail 
to rule out p. Alternately, one may follow Incurvati and Schlöder (ibid.) in putting public 
speech acts first. To assert ‘It might be that p’ is to commit to ruling out adding ~p to 
the conversational context. 
As for conceptual role and inferentialist semantics, as already pointed out, these 
are standardly metasemantic theses, not semantic ones. Nonetheless, it is easy enough 
to combine them with quasirealist semantic commitments. They are both versions of 
meaning is use theories, and as noted, to provide information about how to use an 
expression is often a way of providing an indirect explanation of what something means. 
The expressivist can say that the belief that murder is wrong is a thought about murder, 
as long as she adds it is a disapproving thought about murder. But a conceptual role 
theorist could say something similar. What is the person who believes that cats are 
better than dogs thinking about? The ordered pair, [cats, dogs]. How is she thinking 
about that pair? In a way that commits her to preferring the first member to the second. 
The inferentialist quasirealist story will be similar, but it will put public speech acts first. 
What does the assertion, ‘Cats are better than dogs’ mean? It means cats are better 
than dogs, obviously, but we can say that it also is a commissive speech act, and the 
content of the commitment is the speaker choosing cats over dogs. 
I am not saying that such an alternate but complete account of meaning is 
entailed by conceptual role or inferentialist semantics. Rather, such an alternative 
semantics is compatible with these metasemantic theses, and can be taken on should one 
wish to combine the metasemantic picture with quasirealism. To avoid quasirealism, 
as Wedgwood would, one must reject that the alternative meanings are complete. 
We can now state the general form of quasirealism. To be a quasirealist about 
property F is to accept: 
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INTENTIONAL-GEN. We can completely explain what the belief that F(x1, 
x2, …, xn) is about by giving a characterization of the belief (i) which does not 
mention property F in describing the state’s content, by (ii) describing the belief 
as a nonrepresentational intentional state.  
 
SEMANTIC-GEN. We can provide a complete explanation of what assertion 
‘F(x1, x2, …, xn)’ means in a metalanguage (i) that lacks any terms or expressions 
for ascribing property F, by (ii) saying which nonassertoric speech act the 
assertion performs (e.g., expressive, commissive, imperative). 
 
Mutatis mutandis for quasirealism about object o. 
 
6.3. Two Strategies for Preserving Realism 
My proposal allows for a conceptual role theorist or inferentialist to accept or reject 
quasirealism, depending on whether they go on to accept or reject the semantic 
dispensability theses. But more needs to be said. Even if denial of INTENIONAL-
GEN and SEMANTIC-GEN is logically consistent with either of these metasemantic 
views, one may worry that it is unmotivated. Wedgwood seems committed to holding 
that to believe that cats are better than dogs is equivalent to thinking about cats and 
dogs, in a way that commits us to preferring the one to the other. On what grounds 
could he reject INTENTIONAL-GEN? 
It isn’t enough to say that Wedgwood intends his theory as a metasemantic 
thesis, rather than a semantic one. The problem follows from the nature of meaning is 
use metasemantic theories. They explain why an expression or concept means what it 
means in terms of how the expression or concept is used—but this means that their 
metasemantic explanations can also serve as indirect semantic explanations. (This 
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means one and the same answer is an answer to both the what- and why-question 
about content, something we already saw was possible with expressivism.) 
To see how an inferentialist or conceptual role theorist could reject the 
dispensability theses for some F, an analogy will be helpful. An inflationist about truth, 
a correspondence theorist, for example, can agree that the predicate ‘true’ is a device 
for disquotation, quantification, and indirect assertion. She can even say that describing 
these roles provides important information about the meaning of the term. She will 
deny, however, that any such indirect explanation is complete. The deflationist, by 
contrast, holds that an explanation in such terms would be complete, and so talk of 
truth is in principle dispensable, though it may require a language that allows for forms 
of quantification ruled out by natural language grammar. For the inflationist, we cannot 
dispense with truth talk, even in principle, without losing something.  
Similarly, to accept the two semantic theses for some F is stronger than simply 
saying that the standard semantic value is determined by, say, expressed attitude, or 
inferential commitments, or conceptual role. It is also to say that the traditional 
semantic value is dispensable (in principle) in favor of talk about expressed attitude, 
inferential commitments, or conceptual role. One can embrace the determination 
claim but deny the dispensability claim. 
This is what Wedgwood should do. Given his metasemantics, one could explain 
what someone was thinking about by saying, “She’s thinking about cats and dogs, in a 
way that commits her to preferring the former to the latter.” This explanation may be 
helpful in some contexts, it may provide important information about the content of 
the person’s thought. But, for Wedgwood, it is an incomplete explanation. A complete 
explanation must also make reference to being better than. 
Why reject dispensability? Two obvious reasons come to mind. The first is 
simple conservatism. Both sides, the realist and the quasirealist, agree that wrong is one 
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semantic value of ‘wrong’. Why would our language contain lots of semantic clutter? 
The default should be that semantic values are not dispensable for an explanation of 
what a given utterance means. We should only be quasirealists or deflationists about 
those properties or objects for which special positive reasons for accepting 
dispensability can be given. 
This fits with how expressivists have traditionally presented their view, 
identifying aspects of normative thought and talk that are, well, weird when compared 
with more quotidian descriptive discourse. These idiosyncrasies are supposed to 
motivate a “beneath the surface” understanding of such thought and talk—with the 
implication that the surface understanding is fine for most parts of language. These 
oddities are numerous and well-known: the empirical inaccessibility of normative 
properties, widespread cross-cultural disagreement about their distribution, the tie with 
motivation, atypical intuitions about disagreement and translation, and so on. It may 
be that none of these is a good reason for treating normative properties as dispensable. 
But that is simply to say quasirealism might be wrong, not that there isn’t a distinctive 
view here, or no prima facie motivation for it. The local quasirealist thinks 
indispensability is the default, but thinks it is overcome in special circumstances. 
The assumption that realism is the default fits moreover with a certain ‘just so’ 
story it is natural to see as working in the background. We start off using language to 
communicate what things in the world are like. We do so with sentences with a subject-
predicate structure. What are we communicating with these sentences? Given how 
basic this form of communication is, we have no way of saying, other than to simply 
use the same subject-predicate structure. But after a while our communicative needs 
grow beyond simply saying what the world is like. We find we need to express our 
attitudes, or to indirectly assert and to quantify over the claims of others. In order to 
meet these communicative needs, we end up exploiting the existing subject-predicate 
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structure of our language. We deploy predicates as devices for expressing our feelings 
or for quantifying. The properties ascribed by this mode of communication are 
dispensable, because the relation between what is communicated and subject-predicate 
structure is only one of convenience. 
The second reason to reject dispensability has to do with the connection, already 
noted, between giving a semantic interpretation to some discourse and metatheorizing. 
A metatheoretical interpretation, if it is not to be a debunking account, needs to show 
that the target discourse is a more or less rational activity, that those involved in it can 
be understood as reasoning. A given F (or o) may be semantically indispensable, 
because we cannot make sense of first-order theorizing as a rational activity, unless we 
understand the theorists as talking about F. 
This is Wedgwood’s reason, incidentally, for rejecting expressivism. For the 
expressivist, reasoning about the normative is a matter of establishing greater 
consistency among the relevant desire-like states. But, Wedgewood asks, “Why should 
the agent strive so hard to achieve … intrapersonal and interpersonal consistency…?” 
(2007: 50). If this were all that was at stake, normative reasoning would seem to be ‘a 
bizarre fetish for logical consistency’ (50). Wedgwood argues that we can only make 
sense of this striving for consistency because consistency is a tool for getting things 
right, for making correct judgments; and these judgments are correct in virtue of being 
true (51-57).  
But here we have a difference. The quasirealist thinks that we can exhaustively 
explain what first-order normative discourse is about without mentioning normative 
properties. Wedgwood may think we can explain why discourse is normative without 
mentioning such properties, but as an explanation of what the discourse is about this 
would be incomplete: it would make normative discourse into an elaborate verbal and 
intellectual game, or a strange psychological compulsion. To fully explain what 
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participants are doing and thinking, we need to add that they aim to get things right, 
to think something true. 
Consequently, the full explanation of what the belief that cats are better than 
dogs would have to be: thinking about cats and dogs in a way that commits you to 
preferring cats to dogs in virtue of aiming to be true of cats and dogs. But to be true 
of cats and dogs the thought must predicate something of them. So mentioning the 
better than relation is essential to explaining—saying—what the thought is about. 
Of course, this way of stating Wedgwood’s motivation for realism has it that our 
beliefs aim at truth. Have we smuggled inflationism back in? It seems unlikely. 
Defenders of deflationism have thought their view is compatible with the claim that 
we or our theories, aim at truth (Field 1994: 264-65; Horwich 1998: 63ff.). 
For example, in Wedgwood’s case, we could also say that we can only make 
sense of normative reasoning as reasoning insofar as we interpret normative reasoners 
as aiming to believe p if and only if p, for all normative p. Talk of truth is simply a way 
of getting around the fact that natural language doesn’t allow such forms of 
quantification. 
 
6.4. Metasemantic Expressivism 
Is the solution here compatible with the recent project of interpreting expressivism as 
a metasemantic doctrine? I suspect it is. As noted earlier, metasemantic expressivists, 
such as Chrisman, draw the boundaries between semantics and metasemantics 
differently than I do—identifying semantics with compositional semantics of the sort 
practiced by linguists. But, as noted, they also maintain that truth-conditional semantics 
can be given a non-descriptivist interpretation (Ridge 2014; and Chrisman 2016). For 
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that to be true, compositional semantics must offer incomplete explanations of what 
expressions mean, a point Chrisman explicitly endorses.24 
From what I can tell, then, nothing rules out providing an interpretation of what 
our formal semantics tells us about the meaning of normative expressions which does 
not explain what they mean in terms of normative properties, but nonetheless suffices 
to capture the logical relations between those expressions. That is, metasemantic 
expressivists should be able to satisfy at least SEMANTIC-MINIMAL (or a 
generalized version of it in Chrisman’s case).  
We should remember that the metalanguage in which SEMANTIC-MINIMAL 
is satisfied need not account for all of the compositional properties of English or other 
natural languages. An analogy with deflationism about truth is helpful once again. One 
way of capturing the way in which the property of truth is dispensable to the deflationist 
is to say that we could in principle cease talking about truth without losing anything, if 
it were replaced with forms of quantification natural language does not allow for. In 
short, it is enough to show that we could replace our current language with an artificial 
one that made no reference to truth without losing communicative power. One way 
to think about the challenge of SEMANTIC-MINIMAL, then, is that a quasirealist 
should think we could in principle present our normative theories and arguments in 
 
24 A referee helpfully points out that given Ridge’s account of the semantics of normative terms, it 
is very likely such semantic explanations will always be incomplete (in my sense). The meaning of 
normative sentences is explained for Ridge in terms of acceptable standards of practical reasoning 
(2014: 118ff.). ‘Acceptable’ is a technical notion for Ridge, and so to fully explain what normative 
sentences mean we must say what ‘acceptability’ amounts to. For Ridge, what it is for a standard 
to be acceptable is itself explained in terms of belief-normative perspective pairs, in which a 
normative perspective is, very roughly, made up of commitments to deliberate and choose in 
certain ways (111ff.). 
 32 
an artificial language which made no reference to normative properties, but which 
preserved the narrowly logical relations between those theories and premises (Lenman 
2003). This seems compatible to me with the metasemantic expressivist project. 
 But if I am wrong, then to defend their right to quasirealism, metasemantic 
expressivists (or non-descriptivists) need to show why my arguments in section 6.1 
that SEMANTIC-MINIMAL really is a minimal commitment for quasirealist 
expressivists fail. The basic ideas behind SEMANTIC-MINIMAL are, first, that a 
quasirealist must be able to explain what normative theorizing and reasoning are about 
without mentioning normative properties. Second, this requires at the very least that 
they be able to account for the logical relations between normative thoughts without 
mentioning normative properties. Finally, if they can account for logical relations 
between normative thoughts without mentioning normative content, they should be 
able to account for strictly logical relations between normative sentences without 
mentioning normative content. It should be remembered that I am already assuming 
that arguments are available for thinking most aspects of how normative theorizing is 
linguistically represented are relatively unimportant to understanding the activity. If 
such arguments fail, metasemantic expressivists will need to satisfy something even 
stronger than SEMANTIC-MINIMAL.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Creeping minimalism forces the expressivist to explain how she can preserve what is 
distinctive of her view without embracing a revisionary picture of normative language. 
I have argued expressivism remains distinctive, even if it allows for normative 
properties, because we can say what those engaged in normative discourse are saying 
and thinking without making reference to such properties. This points to a way in 
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which her realism is attenuated: talk and thought about the properties is dispensable. 
This is in the spirit of Dreier’s explanation explanation, but with a novel 
reinterpretation of the kind of explanation we want. If this is right, quasirealists should 
not look to distinguish their view from realism in terms of explanations why expressions 
or thoughts have their content, but rather should say that they are committed to a 
certain kind of explanation of what the content is. This way of drawing the distinction 
avoids the standard objections, and furthermore is revealing of the kind of 
metatheoretical project in which the quasirealist is engaged 
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